【編者按】

從上月以來(lái)，美國(guó)的重要人物如國(guó)務(wù)卿布林肯、財(cái)長(zhǎng)耶倫、美國(guó)總統(tǒng)氣候問(wèn)題特使克里接連訪華。其中最引人注目的恐怕莫過(guò)于百歲高齡的基辛格，中國(guó)國(guó)家主席習(xí)近平、國(guó)務(wù)委員兼國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)李尚福、中央外辦主任王毅先后會(huì)見了他。

一時(shí)間，陰云籠罩的中美關(guān)系似乎如耶倫抵達(dá)北京時(shí)的天空那樣，出現(xiàn)了一道彩虹。然而，中美關(guān)系的陰云并未消散，前路仍有風(fēng)雨。比如，中國(guó)防長(zhǎng)李尚福仍在美國(guó)的制裁名單上。7月12日，中國(guó)駐美大使謝鋒到訪五角大樓，應(yīng)約會(huì)見美國(guó)助理國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)拉特納。《環(huán)球時(shí)報(bào)》稱，拉特納在此時(shí)與謝鋒會(huì)見可能想借一波當(dāng)前中美各領(lǐng)域恢復(fù)互動(dòng)的“東風(fēng)”，反映了美國(guó)國(guó)防部對(duì)于同中方在軍事層面建立溝通管道的迫切需求。謝鋒大使就兩國(guó)兩軍關(guān)系闡明立場(chǎng)，要求美方采取行動(dòng)排除障礙、管控分歧，推動(dòng)兩國(guó)兩軍關(guān)系逐步重回正軌。

正如澎湃新聞（m.dbgt.com.cn）此前刊發(fā)的一篇文章所指出的，中方有等待彩虹的耐心，但美方也需要展現(xiàn)足夠的誠(chéng)意。美方如果真的想恢復(fù)兩國(guó)軍方的交流溝通，以避免危險(xiǎn)的誤判，那現(xiàn)在是時(shí)候解除對(duì)中國(guó)防長(zhǎng)的制裁了。

雖然中美兩國(guó)近期在外交和軍事方面取得了進(jìn)展，但兩國(guó)軍方之間的溝通與交流仍處于凍結(jié)狀態(tài)。美國(guó)對(duì)中國(guó)國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)李尚福上將的制裁是一個(gè)必須解決的癥結(jié)，以避免出現(xiàn)危險(xiǎn)的誤判風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

7月6日，當(dāng)美國(guó)財(cái)政部長(zhǎng)珍妮特·耶倫（Janet Yellen）抵達(dá)北京國(guó)際機(jī)場(chǎng)時(shí)，罕見的一幕出現(xiàn)了：一場(chǎng)陣雨過(guò)后，天空中出現(xiàn)了彩虹。美國(guó)駐華大使尼古拉斯·伯恩斯（Nicolas Burns）不失時(shí)機(jī)地向面帶微笑的耶倫指出了這一點(diǎn)。中國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)院總理李強(qiáng)在會(huì)見耶倫時(shí)也提到了那道彩虹，他說(shuō)：“我想，中美關(guān)系不止是風(fēng)風(fēng)雨雨......經(jīng)歷了風(fēng)雨，我們一定會(huì)看到更多的彩虹?！?/p>

Janet Yellen

現(xiàn)在的問(wèn)題是，在再次見到彩虹之前，我們還要經(jīng)歷多少風(fēng)雨。雖然兩國(guó)在外交和經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域似乎取得了一些小的進(jìn)展，但在一個(gè)關(guān)鍵領(lǐng)域，即中美兩軍之間的溝通卻沒(méi)有任何“去風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”的跡象。

曾幾何時(shí)，中美雙方都認(rèn)為兩國(guó)軍方之間的聯(lián)系與溝通甚至可以成為政治或經(jīng)濟(jì)緊張局勢(shì)中的壓艙石。然而這種樂(lè)觀情緒早已一去不復(fù)返。在時(shí)任美國(guó)眾議院議長(zhǎng)南?！づ迓逦鳎∟ancy Pelosi）竄訪臺(tái)灣之后，北京方面以在臺(tái)海周邊地區(qū)舉行數(shù)日軍事演習(xí)作為回應(yīng)，并中止了中美軍方之間的互動(dòng)。

問(wèn)題在于，即使中國(guó)人民解放軍現(xiàn)在想恢復(fù)對(duì)話，這一選項(xiàng)也根本不存在?，F(xiàn)任中國(guó)國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)、國(guó)務(wù)委員李尚福上將曾擔(dān)任中國(guó)人民解放軍裝備發(fā)展部部長(zhǎng)。自2018年以來(lái)，因中國(guó)從俄羅斯主要武器出口商——俄羅斯國(guó)防出口公司（Rosoboronexport）購(gòu)買戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)和防空導(dǎo)彈系統(tǒng)，他受到美國(guó)方面的制裁。這種制裁本身就是不可理喻的，中國(guó)與俄羅斯的軍事貿(mào)易沒(méi)有違反任何國(guó)際制度，兩個(gè)主權(quán)國(guó)家之間的此類貿(mào)易本就與美國(guó)無(wú)關(guān)。

6 月初在新加坡舉行的香格里拉對(duì)話會(huì)上，李尚福將軍和美國(guó)國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)勞埃德·奧斯汀（Lloyd Austin）只是簡(jiǎn)短地打了個(gè)招呼，然后兩人就面無(wú)表情地坐在同一張桌子上，他們之間沒(méi)有任何眼神交流，這令人唏噓不已。對(duì)話會(huì)的四天前，北京方面拒絕了五角大樓邀請(qǐng)中國(guó)防長(zhǎng)與美國(guó)防長(zhǎng)在新加坡會(huì)面的邀請(qǐng)。

如果說(shuō)歷史能夠提供有益的訓(xùn)誡，那么美國(guó)當(dāng)代史可以從另一個(gè)角度來(lái)解讀，即美國(guó)對(duì)其他國(guó)家的制裁與干預(yù)是如何屢屢失敗的：美國(guó)對(duì)朝鮮和古巴的制裁并沒(méi)有成功實(shí)現(xiàn)政權(quán)更迭；它也沒(méi)能改變緬甸、尼加拉瓜、委內(nèi)瑞拉、敘利亞、也門和伊朗的行為方式。自俄烏沖突以來(lái)，對(duì)俄羅斯的制裁無(wú)論規(guī)模有多大，都只是暫時(shí)性地阻礙了俄羅斯經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展，卻也并沒(méi)有使其嚴(yán)重癱瘓。

對(duì)中國(guó)國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)的輕率制裁正在關(guān)上一扇窗，而保持開放對(duì)兩國(guó)都有好處。不妨試想一下，在中國(guó)國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)的五年任期內(nèi)（比美國(guó)總統(tǒng)的任期還長(zhǎng)），他將無(wú)法訪問(wèn)美國(guó)，也不會(huì)邀請(qǐng)美國(guó)國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)訪華。其他層面的交流即便有也將寥寥無(wú)幾。再想想另一種情形——中美軍方的高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)無(wú)法在2008年建立的中美軍事熱線上彼此溝通，而這條熱線本應(yīng)在南?；蚺_(tái)灣海峽出現(xiàn)最危險(xiǎn)的情況下發(fā)揮關(guān)鍵作用。

在香格里拉對(duì)話會(huì)上，當(dāng)被問(wèn)及中國(guó)海軍艦機(jī)在臺(tái)灣海峽攔截美國(guó)軍艦的問(wèn)題時(shí)，李尚福將軍表示，他希望大家想一想為什么所有類似的問(wèn)題都發(fā)生在中國(guó)附近，而不是其他國(guó)家附近？不可否認(rèn)，兩國(guó)軍方之間的對(duì)話有時(shí)就像 “雞同鴨講”，但有的談總比沒(méi)得談好。缺乏溝通必然會(huì)導(dǎo)致誤解和誤判。

這種缺乏溝通的情況甚至在冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期都沒(méi)有出現(xiàn)過(guò)。盡管存在相當(dāng)程度的敵意，但當(dāng)時(shí)兩個(gè)超級(jí)大國(guó)仍保持著暢通的溝通渠道，并制定了一系列建立信任的措施，其中一些，例如核軍控條約——《新削減戰(zhàn)略武器條約》（New START）即使在發(fā)生了俄烏沖突的情況下仍然有效。

華盛頓方面懷疑中國(guó)將不溝通作為獲取利益的策略。奧斯汀在香格里拉對(duì)話會(huì)上說(shuō)：“對(duì)話不是一種獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)。對(duì)話是必要的?！钡珜?duì)中方來(lái)說(shuō)，美國(guó)的制裁本身就形成了一個(gè)先決條件，在對(duì)話開始前就制造了一種不愉快的氣氛。美國(guó)的立場(chǎng)是，制裁在技術(shù)上并不禁止奧斯汀和李尚福之間的會(huì)晤，因此沒(méi)有必要取消制裁——這是美國(guó)式虛偽的典型例子。

理論上來(lái)說(shuō)，解除對(duì)李尚福的制裁并不困難，因?yàn)橹撇帽旧硎前莸钦梢猿蜂N的行政命令，但這對(duì)美國(guó)總統(tǒng)喬·拜登（Joe Biden）來(lái)說(shuō)可能是個(gè)政治上的挑戰(zhàn)，因?yàn)樗幌Ｍ邡椗裳壑酗@得對(duì)中國(guó)軟弱，尤其是在2024年大選即將到來(lái)的這個(gè)時(shí)間點(diǎn)。

如果這兩支世界上最大的軍隊(duì)在未來(lái)五年內(nèi)仍不進(jìn)行對(duì)話，那么這種局面將比冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期任何時(shí)候都更加危險(xiǎn)。拜登和習(xí)近平主席在去年11月會(huì)晤時(shí)同意為兩國(guó)關(guān)系設(shè)定一個(gè)“底線”，以確保競(jìng)爭(zhēng)不會(huì)滑向沖突。要做到這一點(diǎn)，套用奧斯汀的講話來(lái)說(shuō)就是——解除對(duì)中國(guó)國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)的制裁不是獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)，而是必要的。而正確的時(shí)機(jī)就是馬上。

（周波，清華大學(xué)戰(zhàn)略與安全研究中心研究員。本文英文版首發(fā)于《南華早報(bào)》，英文版原文見下。中文版譯者：劉煒康）

附英文版原文：

Why the US must revoke sanctions on China’s defence minister – now

? While progress has been made on the diplomatic and military front, US-China military-to-military contact remains frozen

? US sanction on Chinese Defence Minister General Li Shangfu is a sticking point that must be resolved to avoid the risk of dangerous miscalculations

When US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen arrived at Beijing’s international airport on July 6, something rare appeared – a rainbow in the sky after a shower. American ambassador to China Nicolas Burns wasted no time in pointing this out to a smiling Yellen. When he met Yellen, Chinese Premier Li Qiang also mentioned the rainbow, saying, “I think there is more to China-US relations than just wind and rain…we will surely see more rainbows after going through the wind and rain.”

The question is how much wind and rain we will have to confront before we see a rainbow again. While there seems to have been small advances in the diplomatic and economic fields, there is no sign of “de-risking” in one crucial area – communication between the two militaries.

There was a time when both sides believed that the military-to-military relationship could even serve as a ballast stone amid political or economic tension. Such optimism is long gone. In the wake of then US House speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, Beijing responded with days of military exercises near and around the island and suspended US-China military-to-military interactions.

The question is even if the People’s Liberation Army wishes to resume dialogue now, it is simply impossible. General Li Shangfu, now Chinese defence minister and state councillor, used to head the PLA’s Equipment Development Department. He has been under US sanctions since 2018 over the purchase of combat aircraft and an air-defence missile system from Rosoboronexport, Russia’s main arms exporter.

This is ridiculous. China’s military trade with Russia was not in violation of any international regime and such trade between two sovereign states has nothing to do with the United States.

At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in early June, it was sad to see General Li and American Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin briefly greet each other and then sit stone-faced at the same table without making eye contact. Four days before the dialogue, Beijing declined the Pentagon’s invitation for a meeting between the Chinese defence minister and his American counterpart in Singapore.

If history provides useful lessons, contemporary American history could be read in another way – how its sanctions on others have repeatedly failed. The US sanctions on North Korea and Cuba didn’t succeed in regime change. Nor did they work in changing the behaviours of Myanmar, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Syria, Yemen and Iran. The sanctions on Russia since the war in Ukraine, however massive, have stymied but not seriously crippled the Russian economy.

A frivolous sanction on China’s defence minister is closing a window that both countries would benefit from keeping open. Just imagine that during the five years of his tenure – longer than the tenure of an American president – China’s defence minister won’t be able to visit the United States and he won’t invite his American counterpart to visit China. There will be few, if any, exchanges at other levels.

Imagine for another moment that the Chinese and American military leaders don’t talk on a hotline which was established in 2008 and is supposed to play a crucial role in the most dangerous situations, be it in the South China Sea or in the Taiwan Strait.

At the Shangri-La Dialogue, when asked about a Chinese navy ship aircraft intercepting a US military vessel in the Taiwan Strait, Li asked people to think why all the problems occurred near China and not near other countries.

Admittedly, the military-to-military dialogue between the two countries sometimes resembles a conversation between people talking at cross-purposes, but it is better than no talk at all. The absence of communication will inevitably lead to misunderstanding and miscalculation.

Such a situation wasn’t even seen during the Cold War. In spite of absolute hostility, the two superpowers maintained open lines of communication and established a series of confidence-building measures, some of which, like the New START nuclear arms control treaty, are still in place, despite the Ukraine war.

Washington suspects that Beijing is using no communication as a strategy for reaping benefits. At the Shangri-La Dialogue, Austin said, “dialogue is not a reward. It is a necessity”. But for Beijing, American sanctions constitute a precondition itself and create a sour atmosphere even before talks start.

The US position that the sanctions do not technically prohibit a meeting between Austin and Li and therefore there is no need to remove them, is a textbook example of American hypocrisy.

Technically speaking, lifting sanctions on Li is not very difficult in that the sanction is an executive order that the Biden administration can revoke, but it might be politically challenging for US President Joe Biden, who doesn’t wish to appear weak towards Beijing in the eyes of China hawks, especially before the election in 2024.

There has been much discussion of whether we have slipped into a new cold war. But if the two largest militaries don’t talk to each other in the next five years, this situation would be more dangerous than anytime during the Cold War.

When they met in November last year, Biden and President Xi Jinping agreed on putting a “floor” under the relationship to ensure that competition did not veer into conflict. For that to happen – to loosely paraphrase Austin’s remarks – lifting sanctions on the Chinese defence minister is not a reward, it is a necessity. And the right time is now.

Senior Colonel Zhou Bo (ret) is a senior fellow of the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and a China Forum expert